ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE

1. Separation of Church and State and Free Practice of Religion have been Paramount (more important than anything else; supreme) From the Founding of Our Nation.

1.1. This Exhibit will present some of the Historical, Legislative, and Judicial basis for the continued staunch protection of the Separation of Church and State along with some of imbedded arguments for applicability to my case.

2. What is church?


2.1.1. “2. The Fourteen (or Fifteen) Points [Un-entanglement ????]

2.1.1.1. [1.] In making the required distinctions between churches and religious organizations that are not churches, the Service has followed the basic principles set out in De La Salle Institute v. United States, 195 F. Supp. 891 (N.D. Cal. 1961). In that case the court, in deciding that a religious order operating schools and a novitiate was not exempt from unrelated business income tax on its winery, stated, at 903, that in the absence of a statutory definition of "church," we should apply "the common meaning and usage of the word."

2.1.1.1.1. "novitiate" – Google: “the period or state of being a novice, especially in a religious order." Legal: Not found. Oxford Dictionaries – Language Matters – on line: “The period or state of being a novice, especially in a religious order.”
http://www.vatican.va/archive/ENG1104/_P25.HTM: “The novitiate, through which life in an institute is begun, is arranged so that the novices better understand their divine vocation, and indeed one which is proper to the institute, experience the manner of living of the institute, and form their mind and heart in its spirit, and so that their intention and suitability are tested.”

2.1.1.2. I argue, who is a better TEACHER than GOD? 1. If you call on HIM and only HIM and walk in HIS way HE will lead you. “then hear THOU in heaven, and forgive the sin of THY servants, THY people, when THOU dost teach them the GOOD WAY in which they should walk; ...” Second Chronicles 6.27. 2. “No one can come to ME unless the FATHER who sent ME draws him; and I will raise him up at the last day. It is written in the prophets, ‘And they shall all be taught by GOD.’ Every one who has heard and learned from the FATHER comes to ME.” John 6.44 – 45. 3. I argue, then only GOD can judge my level of learning and thus a government attempting to judge my learning is more excessive entanglement of state and church.

2.1.1.2. [2.] To apply the "common meaning and usage" of the word "church," the Service attempted to identify historically or judicially recognized objective characteristics of churches. The result was the so-called "fourteen points test," which was later expanded to include a fifteenth criterion - any other facts and circumstances. The word "test" is misleading, as there is
no minimum number of criteria an organization must meet to be classified as a church. Rather, the criteria serve as a guide to assist case-by-case analysis.

2.1.1.2.1. “The word "test" is misleading”, as there is no minimum number of criteria an organization must meet to be classified as a church. Rather, the criteria serve as a guide to assist case-by-case analysis.”

2.1.1.2.1.1. “misleading”: Delusive; calculated to lead astray or to lead into error. Instructions which are of such a nature as to be misunderstood by the jury, or to give them a wrong impression, are said to be "misleading." Citation: Law Dictionary: (Black's Law Dictionary)

2.1.1.2.1.2. The words themselves become misleading and left open for judgement, “Rather, the criteria serve as a guide to assist case-by-case analysis.” and create excessive entanglement of religion and the IRS: the Pigeon Coop is being guarded by a pack of wolverines.

2.1.1.2.1.3. Is “Gathering Center Discipleship” a “Church”? Matthew 18.20: “For where two or three are gathered in MY NAME, there am I in the midst of them.” No Qualification to attend! No judgment! See Exhibit 1 and 2 of the Complaint and Exhibit 9 “of GOD ?”.

2.1.1.3. [3.] In applying the analysis to determine whether a religious organization may properly be characterized as a church, the Service considers whether the organization has the following characteristics: (a) a distinct legal existence, (b) a recognized creed and form of worship, (c) a definite and distinct ecclesiastical government, (d) a formal code of doctrine and discipline, (e) a distinct religious history, (f) a membership not associated with any other church or denomination, (g) an organization of ordained ministers, (h) ordained ministers selected after completing prescribed studies, (i) a literature of its own, (j) established places of worship, (k) regular congregations, (l) regular religious services, (m) Sunday schools for religious instruction of the young, (n) schools for the preparation of its ministers, and (o) any other facts and circumstances that may bear upon the organization's claim for church status. See IRM 7(10)69, Exempt Organizations Examination Guidelines Handbook, text 321.3(3).

2.1.1.3.1. “The word "test" is misleading, as there is no minimum number of criteria an organization must meet to be classified as a church. Rather, the criteria serve as a guide to assist case-by-case analysis.” The words themselves become misleading and left open for judgement, and create excessive entanglement. “Gathering Center Discipleship“ in my opinion meets the characteristics of (b) the tenets shared in the complaint; (d) the WORD of GOD; (e) my work over my life time; (i) “of GOD ?”, the tenets of “Gathering Center Discipleship”, “John 3:16 does not stand alone”; (o) my fight for my Constitutional Rights against the tyranny of the Democrats, etal.

2.1.1.4. [4.] The fifteen criteria are not an attempt to quantify the factual circumstances required for recognition as a church. Determinations are not made solely on the number of
characteristics an organization possesses. Given the variety of religious practice, the determination of what constitutes a church is inherently unquantifiable. Attempts to use a dogmatic numerical approach might unconstitutionally favor established churches at the expense of newer, less traditional institutions.”

2.1.1.4.1. “Given the variety of religious practice, the determination of what constitutes a church is inherently unquantifiable. Attempts to use a dogmatic numerical approach might unconstitutionally favor established churches at the expense of newer, less traditional institutions.” If the words excessively entangle themselves, then those attempting to use the words, the government, is excessively entangled.

2.1.1.4.2. The above is exactly what is argued relative to the government establishing a preference for the Old Order Amish in Exhibit 12 FREE EXERCISE OF SINCERE RELIGIOUS BELIEFS: Partially Restated here: Title 26 U.S.C. § 1402(g) authorizes the Commissioner of Social Security Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare to exempt members of "a recognized religious sect" existing at all times since December 31, 1950, from the obligation to pay social security taxes if they are, by reason of the tenets of their sect, opposed to receipt of such benefits and agree to waive them, provided the Secretary finds that the sect makes reasonable provision for its dependent members. The history of the exemption shows it was enacted with the situation of the Old Order Amish specifically in view. H.R.Rep. No. 213, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 101-102 (1965).

2.1.1.4.2.1. My argument here is the same as before and restated here: I argue, that in so doing Congress and the President also eliminated the possibility for future Free Exercise of Religious Belief exemptions by limiting that the documented religious tenets had to exist as of the end of 1950.

2.1.1.4.2.2. I further argue, that in so doing Congress and the President also violated the Establishment Clause by limiting that the documented religious tenets had to exist as of the end of 1950. And the last sentence of the above footnote paragraph further supports this argument of violation of the Establishment Clause in that it was enacted specifically related to protect the Old Order Amish.

2.1.1.4.2.3. I further argue that this violates mine and anybody else’s right to Free Exercise of Religious beliefs in both developing new beliefs and practicing those beliefs and all the relief that I’m seeking in my complaint should be granted with emphasis on that against those responsible for the civil rights violations; the Unconstitutionality of the ACA, and the Unconstitutionality of the Social Security Act. (1) In actuality my beliefs and practices are of Ancient Of Days, by GOD!!!!

2.2.1. [2.] In its most general sense, the religious society founded and established by Jesus Christ, to receive, preserve, and propagate his doctrines and ordinances. A body or community of Christians, united under one form of government by the profession of the same faith, and the observance of the same ritual and ceremonies. The term may denote either a society of persons who, professing Christianity, hold certain doctrines or observances which differentiate them from other like groups, and who use a common discipline, or the building in which such persons habitually assemble for public worship. Baker v. Fales, 16 Mass. 498; Tate v. Lawrence, 11 Heisk. (Tenn.) 531; In re Zinzow, 18 Misc. Rep. 053, 43 N. Y. Supp. 714; Neale v. St. Paul’s Church, 8 Gill (Md.) 116; Gaff v. Greer, 85 Ind. 122, 45 Am. Rep. 449; Josey v. Trust Co., 100 Ga. 608, 32 S. E. 628. The body of communicants gathered into church order, according to established usage in any town, parish, precinct, or religious society, established according to law, and actually connected and associated therewith for religious purposes, for the time being, is to be regarded as the church of such society, as to all questions of property depending upon that relation. Stebbins v. Jennings, 10 Pick. (Mass.) 193. A congregational church is a voluntary association of Christians united for discipline and worship, connected with, and forming a part of, some religious society, having a legal existence. Anderson v. Brock, 3 Me. 248. In English ecclesiastical law. An institution established by the law of the land in reference to religion. 3 Steph. Comm. 54. The word “church” is said to mean, in strictness, not the material fabric, but the cure of souls and the right of tithes. 1 Mod. 201.”

2.2.1.1. None of these apply for me because of the strong association with Christianity.

2.3. World Book Dictionary; Thorndike and Barnhart 1987: 3a “Usually, Church. A group of persons with the same religious beliefs and under the same authority;”

2.3.1. This does not fit with my definition of church, because it requires judgment by some human authority as to the individual’s beliefs. All judgment is left up to GOD for those freely seeking GOD in Gathering Center Discipleship. See Exhibits 1 & 2 Of The Complaint.

2.4. From Scripture “What is Church”:

2.4.1. Old Testament:

2.4.1.1. Exodus 12.49: “There shall be one law for the native and for the stranger who sojourns among you.”

2.4.1.2. Lev 19.33-34: “When a stranger sojourns with you in your land, you shall not do him wrong. The stranger who sojourns with you shall be to you as the native among you, and you shall love him as yourself; for you were strangers in the land of Egypt: I AM the LORD your GOD.”

2.4.1.3. A biblical distinction is made for the above two versus. 1. A “stranger that sojourns” is one seeking GOD who was not of the original 12 tribes. 2. A “foreigner” was one who comes
among you and believes in a different god or gods. A “god” is anything defined by man and violates the FIRST LAW OF GOD, “You shall have no other gods before or besides ME!”

2.4.2. New Testament:

2.4.2.1. Matthew 16.18: “And I tell you, you are Peter, and on this ROCK I will build MY CHURCH, and the powers of death shall not prevail against it.”

2.4.2.1.1. “MY CHURCH” in the above verse, and my belief, is that it is not a building, it is the body of believers who have the knowledge of the ONENESS of JESUS as the FLESH OF GOD, IMMANUEL, GOD in their midst. “on this ROCK” the knowledge of GOD in their midst: Look at Matthew 16.16: “Simon Peter replied, ‘YOU are the CHRIST, the SON of the LIVING GOD.’” “SON” FLESH of GOD in their midst, as in Exhibit 7 “John 3:16 does not stand alone!!!!!!!”

2.4.2.2. Matthew 18.20: “For where two or three are gathered in MY NAME, there am I in the midst of them.”

2.4.2.2.1. This is “church” for me and all that seek GOD one on ONE. No Qualification to attend! No judgment! Children of GOD freely exchanging their thoughts and ideas so that they may grow when they test everything with GOD! (4) See 2.1.1.4.1. above!!!!

3. What is religion?

3.1. “a pursuit or interest to which someone escribes supreme importance.” Google – religion definition.

3.2. “anything done or followed with reverence or devotion:” World Book Dictionary; Thorndike and Barnhart 1987.

3.3. I hereby certify that I, kevin l olson, pursue the understanding of WHO GOD IS, escribing supreme importance to that pursuit, with reverence and devotion. See Exhibit 8 “religions vs GOD ...” my presentation to North Dakota State University Science Religion Lunch Seminar 22-Mar-2016; Exhibit 9 an electronic file of my journal “of GOD ?”; and Exhibit 10 an electronic file of my work on quantum and cosmic physics, that in the end reveals the ULTIMATE GRACE AND MERCY OF GOD, called “NATURE’S MEND for the Universe ...”

4. The current oath of Americans is as follows:

4.1. § Sec. 337.1 Oath of allegiance.

4.1.1. (a) Form of oath. Except as otherwise provided in the Act and after receiving notice from the district director that such applicant is eligible for naturalization pursuant to § 335.3 of this chapter, an applicant for naturalization shall, before being admitted to citizenship, take in a public ceremony held within the United States the following oath of allegiance, to a copy of which the applicant shall affix his or her signature:
4.1.1. I hereby declare, on oath, that I absolutely and entirely renounce and abjure all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state, or sovereignty, of whom or which I have heretofore been a subject or citizen; that I will support and defend the Constitution and laws of the United States of America against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I will bear arms on behalf of the United States when required by the law; that I will perform noncombatant service in the Armed Forces of the United States when required by the law; that I will perform work of national importance under civilian direction when required by the law; and that I take this obligation freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; so help me God.

4.1.2. (b) Alteration of form of oath; affirmation in lieu of oath. In those cases in which a petitioner or applicant for naturalization is exempt from taking the oath prescribed in paragraph (a) of this section in its entirety, the inapplicable clauses shall be deleted and the oath shall be taken in such altered form. When a petitioner or applicant for naturalization, by reason of religious training and belief (or individual interpretation thereof), or for other reasons of good conscience, cannot take the oath prescribed in paragraph (a) of this section with the words "on oath" and "so help me God" included, the words "and solemnly affirm" shall be substituted for the words "on oath," the words "so help me God" shall be deleted, and the oath shall be taken in such modified form. Any reference to "oath of allegiance" in this chapter is understood to mean equally "affirmation of allegiance" as described in this paragraph.

4.1.3. (c) Obligations of oath. A petitioner or applicant for naturalization shall, before being naturalized, establish that it is his or her intention, in good faith, to assume and discharge the obligations of the oath of allegiance, and that his or her attitude toward the Constitution and laws of the United States renders him or her capable of fulfilling the obligations of such oath.

4.1.4. (d) Renunciation of title or order of nobility. A petitioner or applicant for naturalization who has borne any hereditary title or has been of any of the orders of nobility in any foreign state shall, in addition to taking the oath of allegiance prescribed in paragraph (a) of this section, make under oath or affirmation in public an express renunciation of such title or order of nobility, in the following form: (1) I further renounce the title of (give title or titles) which I have heretofore held; or (2) I further renounce the order of nobility (give the order of nobility) to which I have heretofore belonged.


4.2. Citation: Official Website of the Department of Homeland Security \ U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service \ slb \ SERVICE LAW BOOKS MENU \ TITLE 8 OF CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS (8 CFR) \ 8 CFR PART 337 – OATH OF ALLEGIANCE \ § Sec. 337.1 Oath of allegiance.
4.3. The Government has seen fit to so protect the Separation of Church and State, that it is allowing new citizens to delete the words “so help me God” from the oath. How then can that same government force a natural born citizen to participate in a program that allows other religious organizations to be exempt? This in my opinion violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment of the Constitution of United States of America and creates excessive entanglement of the government and church/religion.

4.4. Waiver or Modification of the Oath of Allegiance. In certain circumstances there can be a modification or waiver of the Oath of Allegiance. These circumstances are as follows:

4.4.1. If you are unable or unwilling to promise to bear arms or perform noncombatant service because of religious training and belief, you may request to leave out those parts of the oath. USCIS may require you to provide documentation from your religious organization explaining its beliefs and stating that you are a member in good standing.

4.4.2. If you are unable or unwilling to take the oath with the words “on oath” and “so help me God” included, you must notify USCIS that you wish to take a modified Oath of Allegiance. Applicants are not required to provide any evidence or testimony to support a request for this type of modification. See 8 CFR 337.1(b).

4.4.3. USCIS can waive the Oath of Allegiance when it is shown that the person’s physical or developmental disability, or mental impairments, makes them unable to understand, or to communicate an understanding of, the meaning of the oath. See 8 USC 337. Hereditary Titles. If you have any hereditary titles or positions of nobility, you must renounce at the oath ceremony.

4.4.4. The new liberal-socialist-communist-democrats protect Illegal Aliens and don’t want a fast track immigration system because once you reach 50 years and have been here for 20 you don’t need to take the oath, guess who they will vote for! See INA: ACT 312 – Requirements as to Understanding the English Language, History, Principles, and Form of Government of the United States. Just more voter manipulation to put US under Absolute Despotism.

4.4.5. Citation: https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/files/article/chapter5.pdf

5. History, Separation of Church and State - The Metaphor and the Constitution

5.1. "Separation of church and state" is a common metaphor that is well recognized. Equally well recognized is the metaphorical meaning of the church staying out of the state's business and the state staying out of the church's business. Because of the very common usage of the "separation of church and state phrase," most people incorrectly think the phrase is in the constitution. The phrase "wall of separation between the church and the state" was originally
coined by Thomas Jefferson in a letter to the Danbury Baptists on January 1, 1802. His purpose in this letter was to assuage [make less intense, ease, mitigate] the fears of the Danbury, Connecticut Baptists, and so he told them that this wall had been erected to protect them. The metaphor was used exclusively to keep the state out of the church's business, not to keep the church out of the state's business.

5.1.2. The constitution states, "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." Both the free exercise clause and the establishment clause place restrictions on the government concerning laws they pass or interfering with religion. No restrictions are placed on religions except perhaps that a religious denomination cannot become the state religion.

5.1.3. Citation: AllAboutGOD.com PO Box 507 Peyton, Colorado 80831: All About History “Separation of Church and State”.

5.1.3.1. Excerpt from their “About Us”: “Although we reject man-made religion, we consider the personal pursuit of God as paramount in each of our personal life journeys. We also believe that ultimate, saving Truth is found only through God’s Son, Jesus Christ.”

5.2. I to reject man-made religion and thus the structure of the tenets of my beliefs shared in the complaint as Exhibits 1 & 2! However, I do not believe that JESUS CHRIST was, is, and ever shall be the literal “son of GOD”, but that the CHRIST of 2000+ years ago was GOD, HIMSELF, in the FLESH walking amongst HIS Children to return them to HIM one on ONE, face to FACE, in HIS PROCESS OF ANCIENT OF DAYS ISRAEL. My beliefs are solely based on the TEACHINGS of GOD, that it is a one on ONE relationship that GOD SEEKS with each of us, without interference or hindrance from anyone or anything, such as tenets established and/or defined by women or men. The following excerpts, from the revised standard version of the bible copyright old testament 1952, copyright new testament 1946 Zondervan Publishing House, are four expressions of this tenet along with the ONE TRUE definition of ISRAEL:

5.2.1. Exodus 20.3: “You shall have no other gods before or besides ME!”

5.2.1.1. I read, understand, and practice this; the following; and other verses, as a Ministerial Duty, to strive only with GOD alone, one on ONE for my flesh and soul, and that any doctrine or tenets that require another person to confess my beliefs becomes a “god” between them and GOD.

5.2.2. Ezekiel 14.12-14: “And the WORD of the LORD came to me: ‘Son of man, when a land sins against ME by acting faithlessly, and I stretch out MY HAND against it, and break its staff of bread and send famine upon it, and cut off from it man and beast, even if these three men, Noah, Daniel, and Job, were in it, they would deliver but their own lives by their righteousness, say the LORD GOD.’ ”
5.2.2.1. **Your membership in a manmade religion cannot save you, only your life in GOD one on ONE, righteousness, can save you!**

5.2.2.2. In 1781, Thomas Jefferson, the author of the Declaration of Independence and later the Nation’s third President, in his work titled ‘Notes on the State of Virginia’ wrote: ‘God who gave us life gave us liberty. And can the liberties of a nation be thought secure when we have removed their only firm basis, a conviction in the minds of the people that these liberties are of the Gift of God. That they are not to be violated but with His wrath? Indeed, I tremble for my country when I reflect that God is just; that his justice cannot sleep forever.’ **And The god of Jefferson is rooted in the Anglican Church, a Christian Church. However, he developed a distrust of organized religion. In his old age, he wrote: “To love GOD with all thy heart and thy neighbor as thyself is the sum of religion.” Citation: “of GOD ?” Page 524 3).**

5.2.3. Ezekiel 3.18 – 19: ‘If I say to the wicked, ‘You shall surely die,’ and you give him no warning, nor speak to warn the wicked from his wicked way, in order to save his life, that wicked man shall die in his iniquity; but his blood I will requite at your hand. But if you warn the wicked, and he does not turn from his wickedness, or from his wicked way, he shall die in his iniquity; but you will have saved your life.”

5.2.3.1. **I speak, but I cannot force. It is up to each and every one of us to walk with GOD one on ONE.**

5.2.4. Zechariah 14.9: “And the LORD will become KING over all the earth; on that day the LORD will be ONE and HIS NAME ONE.”

5.2.5. **ISRAEL: From footnote “u” in Genesis 32.28: “That is he who strives with GOD or GOD STRIVES.”**

5.2.5.1. **Note: It is not they, them, or a plurality. It is a singularity “he”. Noting secondarily that “he” is generic with GOD as in Genesis 1.27: “So GOD created man in HIS OWN IMAGE, in the IMAGE of GOD HE CREATED him; male and female HE CREATED them.”**

6.0. The Founding Fathers Established the Bill of Rights for all Americans as part of the Constitution with the very First Amendment requiring separation of church and state by the government with the Establishment Clause.

6.0.1. Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.

6.0.2. **The Supreme Law of the Land of the United States here establishes my protection from government established religion as a “Ministerial Duty” of Congress and the President. It is a**
“Ministerial Duty” by oath for the Congress and the President to protect and defend the Constitution.

7. Establishment Clause: Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion ...

7.1. The Judiciary has abridged this slightly by not allowing religious practice that puts the greater public at substantial risk. We will have to follow along to see what the Congress, President, and Judiciary have said relating to my case.


8.1. (a) Findings The Congress finds that— (1) the framers of the Constitution, recognizing free exercise of religion as an unalienable right, secured its protection in the First Amendment to the Constitution; (2) laws “neutral” toward religion may burden religious exercise as surely as laws intended to interfere with religious exercise;

8.1.1. The ACA attempts to be neutral to religion by allowing for a Religious exemption, however, by the restrictive nature of the language and requirements to qualify for a Religious Exemption under the ACA, the ACA in fact violates the separation of church and state, and goes beyond by punishing those individuals who practice a different religion than the established exempt religion by fining them for non-participation in the ACA. This goes beyond excessive entanglement and moves into tenets of a government only recognized and accepted religion. The penalty, has been ruled a tax, and the language of that tax, matches exactly with the text of the al-quran zakat tax, making the government only recognized and accepted religion even more specific. Thus the request for the entire laws of the ACA and the Social Security Act to be rendered unconstitutional. Further arguments for the unconstitutionality of the entire law to follow and also in Exhibit 17 COMPENSATORY DAMAGES & CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE ACA AND SSA.

8.1.2. (3) governments should not substantially burden religious exercise without compelling justification;

8.1.2.1. There is no compelling justification why the Congress and President should substantially burden my religious free exercise.

8.1.3. (4) in Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) the Supreme Court virtually eliminated the requirement that the government justify burdens on religious exercise imposed by laws neutral toward religion;

8.1.3.1. Emphasis supra Exhibit 12.
8.1.3.2. Is this “Separation of Powers” and “Checks and Balances” at work? I am seeking “Checks and Balances” of “Ministerial Duties”, and “Overreach of Power” of the Congress and President in my case.

8.1.4. (5) the compelling interest test as set forth in prior Federal court rulings is a workable test for striking sensible balances between religious liberty and competing prior governmental interests.

8.1.4.1. Excerpts from two of those rulings listed below will be presented and commented on later in this Exhibit.

8.2. (b) Purposes The purposes of this chapter are—

8.2.1. (1) to restore the compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) and to guarantee its application in all cases where free exercise of religion is substantially burdened; and

8.2.1.1. By the limitations of date “1950” for establishing acceptable religious tenets; coercion of loss of SSA FICA; and penalties of non-participation the government has excessive entangled with religion and violating my free exercise of my beliefs and substantially burdening me.

8.2.2. (2) to provide a claim or defense to persons whose religious exercise is substantially burdened by government.

8.2.2.1. As the Supreme Court has established in Helvering vs. Davis (1937) and Flemming v. Nestor (1960) the Congresses and President have power to control the disposition of government programs, the Congress and President here in the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), which became law in 11/16/1993 allows for a claim who’s free exercise of religion is substantially burdened by the government. My complaint is just that: the government is substantially burdening mine and others free exercise of religious beliefs. Thus my claim for Relief of a return of what I have had to pay for the ACA and the Social Security Act with annual rate of the DOW, should be granted.


9.2. 11/16/1993 Became Public Law No: 103-141.

9.3. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 - Prohibits any agency, department, or official of the United States or any State (the government) from substantially burdening a person's exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, except that
the government may burden a person's exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that
application of the burden to the person: (1) furthers a compelling governmental interest; and
(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.

9.3.1. As My complaint is just that: the government is substantially burdening mine and others
free exercise of religious beliefs without a compelling government interest.

9.3.2. Nothing in the ACA or Social Security Act substantiates a compelling governmental
interest to substantially restrict or burden mine and/or others free exercise of religious beliefs.

9.3.3. I argue that the governmental interest here is political for the interest of one party, the
Democrats, to protect certain small interest groups of individuals so that, that party can garner
votes, all be it subtly and maybe indirectly, and control the government. This argument is being
made because the ACA substantially burdens more people financially than it benefits.

9.3.3.1. Under Title 18 Chapter 29 U.S. Code § 597 - Expenditures to influence voting

9.3.3.1.1. Whoever makes or offers to make an expenditure to any person, either to vote or
withhold his vote, or to vote for or against any candidate; and

9.3.3.1.2. Whoever solicits, accepts, or receives any such expenditure in consideration of his
vote or the withholding of his vote—

9.3.3.1.3. Shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than one year, or both; and if
the violation was willful, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than two years,
or both.

9.3.3.2. Under Title 18 Chapter 29 U.S. Code 598. Coercion by means of relief appropriations

9.3.3.2.1. Whoever uses any part of any appropriation made by Congress for work relief, relief,
or for increasing employment by providing loans and grants for public-works projects, or
exercises or administers any authority conferred by any Appropriation Act for the purpose of
interfering with, restraining, or coercing any individual in the exercise of his right to vote at any
election, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than one year, or both.

9.3.3.3. I think the Democrats are using the ACA to coerce votes from a very small minority,
as they do with many other laws to protect small groups of voters to build their coalition and
overtake our Republic. See issues with INA for not having to take the oath supra.

9.3.3.3. Citation: uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?path=/prelim@title18/part1/chapter29 —
CHAPTER 29 ELECTIONS AND POLITICAL ACTIVITIES Code 597 and 598.

9.4. Sets forth provisions pertaining to judicial relief, attorney’s fees, and applicability.
9.4.1. Declares that: (1) nothing in this Act shall be construed to interpret the clause of the First Amendment to the Constitution prohibiting the establishment of religion; (2) the granting of government funding, benefits, or exemptions, to the extent permissible under that clause, shall not constitute a violation of this Act; and (3) as used in this Act, “granting” does not include the denial of government funding, benefits, or exemptions.

9.4.1.1. As the Supreme Court has established in Helvering vs. Davis (1937) and Flemming v. Nestor (1960) the Congresses and President have power to control the disposition of government programs, the Congress and President here in the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), which became law in 11/16/1993 allows for the granting of benefits, or exemptions. Furthermore, it establishes that “granting” does not include denial of government benefits or exemptions.

9.4.1.1.1. It is argued that by the restrictive tenets establishment year of “1950”; coercion of loss of SSA FICA; and penalties of non-participation in the ACA that the ACA and subsequently the SSA FICA are violating this provision of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 and my free exercise of my religious beliefs. Thus my claim for a return of what I have had to pay for the ACA and the SSA FICA with annual rate of the DOW, should be granted.

9.5. Citation: Gongress.gov, Home > Legislation > 103rd Congress > H.R.1308
10.1. A case of mingling State and Religion that was held to be constitutional.
10.2. MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, concurring.
10.2.1. “Although I join the opinion and judgment of the Court, I wish to emphasize certain of the principles which I believe to be central to the determination of this case, and which I think are implicit in the Court's decision. The attitude of government toward religion must, as this Court has frequently observed, be one of neutrality. Neutrality is, however, a coat of many colors. It requires that "government neither engage in nor compel religious practices, that it effect no favoritism among sects or between religion and nonreligion, and that it work deterrence of no religious belief."

10.2.1.1. I argue that in my case the ACA and the Social Security Act fail the test of “The attitude of government toward religion must, as this Court has frequently observed, be one of neutrality. Neutrality is, however, a coat of many colors. It requires that "government neither engage in nor compel religious practices, that it effect no favoritism among sects or between religion and nonreligion, and that it work deterrence of no religious belief." because both the ACA and the Social Security Act show favoritism and protection for the tenets of the “Old Order Amish” religion.
10.3. MR. JUSTICE BLACK, dissenting.

10.3.1. The Court here affirms a judgment of the New York Court of Appeals which sustained the constitutionality of a New York law providing state tax raised funds to supply school books for use by pupils in schools owned and operated by religious sects. I believe the New York law held valid is a flat, flagrant, open violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments which, together, forbid Congress or state legislatures to enact any law "respecting an establishment of religion." For that reason I would reverse the New York Court of Appeals' judgment. This, I am confident, would be in keeping with the deliberate statement we made in Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U. S. 1, 330 U. S. 15-16 (1947), and repeated in McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U. S. 203, 333 U. S. 210-211 (1948), that:

10.3.1.1. "Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another. Neither can force nor influence a person to go to or to remain away from church against his will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No person can be punished for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or non-attendance. No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious activities or institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice religion. Neither a state nor the Federal Government can, openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious (Page 392 U. S. 251) organizations or groups, and vice versa. In the words of Jefferson, the clause against establishment of religion by law was intended to erect 'a wall of separation between church and State."

10.3.1.2. I argue in my case that the ACA and the Social Security Act fail the tests of "Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another. Neither can force nor influence a person to go to or to remain away from church against his will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No person can be punished for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or non-attendance."

10.3.1.2.1. The ACA and the Social Security Act aid the “Old Order Amish” and show preference for it by structuring the “Religious Exemptions for the Acts” around the tenets of this religion.

10.3.1.2.2. The ACA and the Social Security Act “force [a person] him to profess a belief or disbelief in [a] any religion” by structuring the “Religious Exemptions for the Acts” around the tenets of the “Old Order Amish”, and the penalty tax around islamic sharia code.

10.3.1.3. “Neither a state nor the Federal Government can, openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious (Page 392 U. S. 251) organizations or groups, and vice versa. In the words of Jefferson, the clause against establishment of religion by law was intended to erect 'a wall of separation between church and State.'"
10.3.1.3.1. “openly or secretly” The ACA fails the “Lemon Test: First, the law or policy must have been adopted with a neutral or non-religious purpose” in that its structuring, as stated in President Obama’s response to me “Because of the Affordable Care Act, millions of Americans finally have access to quality, affordable health insurance.” is for a minority vs a majority. U.S. DHHS released numbers on 07-Jan-2016 that a total of 11.3 million enrolled. U.S. Population is 323.8 million. That results in only 3.5% of Americans participating in the plan.

10.3.1.3.1.1. The religion of islam’s sharia law of economics states that, “All Muslims who live above the subsistence level must pay an annual alms, known as zakat. This is not charity, but rather an obligation owed by the eligible Muslim to the poor of the community.” I think this holds very applicable to what the ACA is intended to do in providing for health care for those who can’t afford it and penalizing those for not participating. Furthermore, considering the failure of President Obama to identify the actions of the Fundamental Sunni Sharia Islamic Code Fighters, as Radical Muslim Terrorists et al, the ACA has overtones of the Sharia Law of economics from a Socialist who has a background related to Islam. Is not one of the Democrats in the presidential primary election a declared socialist? This also relates to my arguments about the party of the Democrats being a collation party, the new liberal-socialist-communist democrats. Supra PLAINTIFF’S DETAILED PLEADINGS 4 FREEDOM 2.3.23. Let us Turn to Hamilton in Federalist Paper No. 1. See Exhibits 20, 21, & 22 for additional overtones of President Obama and his actions in support of Islamic elements.

10.3.1.3.2. I argue that I’m not the only one that thinks the Federal Government acts secretly with laws, “openly or secretly” Marci Hamilton writing for Justia, posted in Religion and Speech, 16-Apr-2015, The One-Religious-World-View Public Policy of the Conservative Christians and the Way Out: The following are a couple of excerpts from the article:

10.3.1.3.2.1. “When RFRA [Religious Freedom Restoration Act] began its journey through our society in 1993, the conservative Christian agenda was so deeply buried that the “Coalition for the Free Exercise of Religion” included the ACLU, Americans United for Separation of Church and State, and People for the American Way. President Clinton proudly signed it.”

10.3.1.3.2.2. “While the RFRA movement started with a remarkable even if utterly misguided bipartisan coalition, it is increasingly clear that one religious cohort in the United States has stood to benefit, and that the RFRA push is really just an integral part of the larger goal of imposing one religious world view on national and state public policy. The result is that the claim to a generic religious liberty now rings hollow. More importantly, it is time for our elected representatives to be reminded that, under the Constitution, they are required to represent all Americans, regardless of faith or creed.”

10.3.1.3.2.3. I argue with emphasis on “required to represent all Americans, regardless of faith or creed.” I’m not a jew-christian-muslim for identifying with one of these or any other
manmade religion is a violation of the FIRST LAW of GOD, that's why the tenets of my beliefs are structured that membership and judgment are decided by GOD.

10.3.2. I argue that the ACA and the Social Security Act are “flat, flagrant open violation[s] of the First and Fourteenth Amendments which, together, forbid Congress or state legislatures to enact any law "respecting an establishment of religion."

10.3.2.1. The ACA and the Social Security Act aid the “Old Order Amish” and show preference for it by structuring the “Religious Exemptions for the Acts” around the tenets of this religion, and the religion of islam’s sharia law of economics, supra. Therefore, the ACA and the Social Security Act should be declared unconstitutional in their entirety.

11. U.S. Supreme Court Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984) “The city of Pawtucket, R.I., annually erects a Christmas display in a park owned by a nonprofit organization and located in the heart of the city's shopping district. The display includes, in addition to such objects as a Santa Claus house, a Christmas tree, and a banner that reads "SEASONS GREETINGS," a crèche or Nativity scene.” The court allowed it to remain.

11.1. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER delivered the opinion of the Court.

11.2. JUSTICE O'CONNOR, concurring.

11.2.1. I concur in the opinion of the Court. I write separately to suggest a clarification of our Establishment Clause doctrine. The suggested approach leads to the same result in this case as that taken by the Court, and the Court's opinion, as I read it, is consistent with my analysis.

11.2.2. I

11.2.2.1. The Establishment Clause prohibits government from making adherence to a religion relevant in any way to a person's standing in the political community. Government can run afoul of that prohibition in two principal ways.

11.2.2.2. One is excessive (Page 465 U. S. 688) entanglement with religious institutions, which may interfere with the independence of the institutions, give the institutions access to government or governmental powers not fully shared by nonadherents of the religion, and foster the creation of political constituencies defined along religious lines. E.g., Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U. S. 116 (1982).

11.2.2.2.1. I argue that the ACA and the Social Security Act create an excessive entanglement with the religious institution of “Old Order Amish”, and islam in that it is in one form or another that some of their tenets must be adhered to, to meet the test of Religious Exemption for the ACA and the Social Security Act; that they are protected by the Government from penalties that are imposed upon me for non-adherents to their religious tenets because their tenets are not shared by my beliefs as expressed supra and in Exhibits; that the ACA fosters the creation of
political constituencies defined along religious lines including islamic sharia law as discussed previously; and that the ACA and the Social Security Act be declared unconstitutional in totality for this reason, let alone those argued elsewhere.

11.2.2.3. The second and more direct infringement is government endorsement or disapproval of religion. Endorsement sends a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the political community. Disapproval sends the opposite message. See generally Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U. S. 203 (1963).

11.2.2.3.1. I argue that the ACA and the Social Security Act create an endorsement of religion with the structure of tenets for Religious Exemption being based on the “Old Order Amish”, and the penalty tax, based on the zakat tax of islamic sharia code. I feel very much an outsider in America today, where I once thought I was free to practice my beliefs, these tenets are used by the Government to disapprove of my beliefs, fine me with a religious tax, and then take away my Social Security Benefits causing me Great “Pains and Penalties”.

11.2.2.3.2. I further argue that because of the most favorable actions of the President towards the religion of islam; his background in islam; the ACA penalty tax representative of islamic sharia code; and his response to me when I requested help to petition the Government for a redress of grievances related to my beliefs, that the president is against our Republic form of Government and our Constitution. (5) See 3RD MOP Section 6.

11.2.2.4. Our prior cases have used the three-part test articulated in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U. S. 602, 403 U. S. 612-613 (1971), as a guide to detecting these two forms of unconstitutional government action. * It has never been entirely clear, however, (Page 465 U. S. 689) how the three parts of the test relate to the principles enshrined in the Establishment Clause. Focusing on institutional entanglement and on endorsement or disapproval of religion clarifies the Lemon test as an analytical device.

11.2.2.4.1. I argue that in my case the “Lemon Test” is a very centerline application, not too narrow and not too wide, with the ACA and the Social Security Act rigidly failing it in the Second and Third steps. And the ACA also failing it on the First Step because of the islamic sharia code implications. See how I applied the “Lemon Test” as an analytical device to the ACA and the Social Security Act later in this Exhibit.

11.3. JUSTICE BRENNAN, with whom JUSTICE MARSHALL, JUSTICE BLACKMUN, and JUSTICE STEVENS join, dissenting.

11.3.1. The principles announced in the compact phrases of the Religion Clauses have, as the Court today reminds us, ante at 465 U. S. 678-679, proved difficult to apply. Faced with that uncertainty, the Court properly looks for guidance to the settled test announced in Lemon v.

Applying that test to this case, the (Page 465 U. S. 695) Court reaches an essentially narrow result which turns largely upon the particular holiday context in which the city of Pawtucket's nativity scene appeared. The Court's decision implicitly leaves open questions concerning the constitutionality of the public display on public property of a creche standing alone, or the public display of other distinctively religious symbols such as a cross. [Footnote 2/1] Despite the narrow contours of the Court's opinion, our precedents, in my view, compel the holding that Pawtucket's inclusion of a life-sized display depicting the biblical description of the birth of Christ as part of its annual Christmas celebration is unconstitutional. Nothing in the history of such practices or the setting in which the city's creche is presented obscures or diminishes the plain fact that Pawtucket's action amounts to an impermissible governmental endorsement of a particular faith.

11.3.1.1. It is interesting to note that both the “Concurring Opinion” and the “Dissenting Opinion” apply the “Lemon Test”. First is in the Concurring Opinion it’s very narrow, and secondly in the Dissenting Opinion it is very broad. I argue that in my case it is a very centerline application, not too narrow and not too broad, with the ACA and the Social Security Act rigidly failing it in the Second and Third steps. And the ACA failing it on the First Step because of the islamic sharia code implications. See how I applied the “Lemon Test” as an analytical device to the Social Security Act later in this Exhibit.


12.1. A Presidential Proclamation declaring 1983 as the "Year of the Bible" is not law and does not suffer the same burden as law and Separation of Church and State.

12.2. Excerpts from the ruling of the court “What is law:

12.2.1. "Law" as it was understood in 1789 and today cannot be comprehended differently. Webster's Third New International Dictionary (unabridged) defines law as:

12.2.1.1. 1a (1): a binding custom or practice of a community: a rule or mode of conduct or action that is prescribed or formally recognized as binding by a supreme controlling authority or is made obligatory by a sanction (as an edict, decree, rescript, order, ordinance, statute, resolution, rule, judicial decision or usage) made, recognized or enforced by the controlling authority.

12.2.1.2. Fundamental to the existence of a law is the obligation it creates and the sanction it imposes. It is a matter of compulsion and does not take the nature of a plea, suggestion or request. That is the single thrust of defining law in Blackstone's Commentaries *1377 and the Supreme Court in American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 29 S. Ct. 511, 53 L. Ed.
826 (1909), and United States Fidelity & G. Co. v. Guenther, 281 U.S. 34, 50 S. Ct. 165, 74 L. Ed. 683 (1929).

12.2.1.3. The "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amendment means at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another. At p. 15, 67 S.Ct. at p. 511.

12.2.1.3.1. I argue here that the ACA and the Social Security Act are laws and that these laws aid one religion and prefer one religion over another through the 1965 act incorporating the language for 1950 and protection of the Old Order Amish and the ACA and it use of the islamic code implications creating excessive entanglement of the Federal Government with religions.

12.2.1.3.2. This excessive entanglement of preference of one religion over another is evidenced by the language of Internal Revenue Bulletin: 2007-6, February 5. 2007 Exception to the HIPAA Nondiscrimination Requirements for Certain Grandfathered Church Plans, See Exhibit 14 with emphasis on the highlighted phrase, “The exception for certain grandfathered church plans was added to section 9802, in subsection (c), by section 1532 of the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Public Law 105-34 (111 Stat. 788).” (6) See also 2.1. https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/eotopica94.pdf above.

12.2.1.3.3. “What a tangled web we weave when first we practice to deceive!” From the poem Marmion, by Water Scott, Esc. “We”, here being the Federal Government and with emphasis on the controlling party, the Democrats. For ACA and the Social Security Act and most other associated laws involving excessive entanglement of government and religion were born when that party was in control. The ACA and the Social Security Act are laws with excessive entanglement to religions, and more so with a specific religion of the “Old Order Amish” and the islamic sharia code and should be declared unconstitutional.


13.1. Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II–A–1, II–A–3, II–B, III, and IV, concluding that the laws in question were enacted contrary to free exercise principles, and they are void. Pp. 531–540, 542–547.

13.1.1. (a) Under the Free Exercise Clause, a law that burdens religious practice need not be justified by a compelling governmental interest if it is neutral and of general applicability. Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U. S. 872. However, where such a law is not neutral or not of general application, it must undergo the most rigorous of scrutiny: It must be justified by a compelling governmental interest and must be narrowly tailored to advance that interest. Neutrality and general applicability are interrelated, and
failure to satisfy one requirement is a likely indication that the other has not been satisfied. Pp. 531–532.

13.1.1. I argue here that the ACA and the Social Security Act are laws that are not neutral or of general application because they allow for “The exception for certain grandfathered churches” and thus create excessive entanglement of Government and Religion. Furthermore the Social Security Act is only for those who specifically contribute to it, and not all are required to contribute to it. Thus the same ruling of voiding the laws associated with denying the practice of the CHURCH OF THE LUKUMI BABALU AYE, INC., et al. v. CITY OF HIALEAH should be applied to my case and the ACA and the Social Security Act should be declared unconstitutional. This will be further argued in Exhibit 17 COMPENSATORY DAMAGES & CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE ACA AND SSA.

13.1.2. Opinion of the Court II, The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, which has been applied to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, see Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 303 (1940), provides that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .” (Emphasis added.) The city does not argue that Santeria is not a “religion” within the meaning of the First Amendment. Nor could it. Although the practice of animal sacrifice may seem abhorrent to some, “religious beliefs need not be acceptable, logical, consistent, or comprehensible to others in order to merit First Amendment protection.”

13.1.2.1. I argue that the ACA and the Social Security Act require that my religious beliefs meet that of the religion of “Old Order Amish” to qualify for exemption or I have to comply with islamic sharia law economic code and pay a zakat tax as a penalty and thus the ACA and the Social Security Act are Laws that respect one establishment of religion over another and thus are violating the Establishment Clause and should be declared unconstitutional.

13.1.2.2. I hereby certify that my choosing not to carry “life” and “medical” insurance is based on the fact that I do not fear death: I do not seek it, but I’m not afraid of it. Also nothing in the tenets of my belief [I do not] force anyone to believe or practice as I do because that violates the GIFT of “FREE WILL” granted to each of us by GOD. Asking anyone to confess to my beliefs or any other religious beliefs is a violation of the FIRST LAW of GOD and interference with HIS GIFT of “FREE WILL”, I believe Thomas Jefferson understood this when he wrote the Declaration of Independence and was involved in its final form, and when he participated in the construction of our Constitution, and as our Third President.

13.1.2.3. It is my belief that the Government, emphasis on the party of the Democrats, plays on the fears of people and creates laws for the protection of small groups of people to form a collation of these groups of people to control the Government. I would argue that America was never intended to be a collation style government. This is further argued in the fact that these
laws protect one group of religious people over another and originated under the Democrats and that the entanglement of religious exemption was incorporated to these laws to specifically protect that religion as noted above with the limiting phrase “The exception for certain grandfathered church plans”. When the Government plays off the fears of groups of people it is no longer about our Republic and voting, but Tyranny, such as arbitrary use of power in not responding to my criminal complaint, with a Democrat in charge of the DOJ, but jumping all over North Carolina for attempting to protect the majority from a minority. North Carolina did not stop the transgender people from using public facilities, it merely is protecting the majority from that very tiny group until a better understanding of the conditions, needs, and hardships faced by the minority is determined. To express Leon’s thoughts, from Fargo, ND calling into the Jay Thomas Show on WDAY Radio, “It makes no sense to claim that NC is discriminating. When I’m walking down the street I can’t tell if a person is transgender, but when you look at me you know I’m black!” The Democrat’s Train of Tyranny is at full steam protecting their laws, their people, and forcing others to comply or be broken.


14.1. MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, in a separate opinion in Walz, supra, echoed the classic warning as to "programs, whose very nature is apt to entangle the state in details of administration. . . ." Id. at 397 U. S. 695. Here we find that both statutes foster an impermissible degree of entanglement.

14.2. This is the case of the “Lemon Test”. And in that case the court found “that both statutes foster an impermissible degree of entanglement”. I argue in applying that test to my case:

14.2.1. First, the law or policy must have been adopted with a neutral or non-religious purpose.

14.2.1.1. I will concede that this appears to be the case for the Social Security Act in that it was intend to provide financial protection for a majority of American’s after a very dark time in our history. It was part of the “New Deal” after banks failed because a lack of regulation, and individuals lost all their savings. And it was repeated in 2008 after the Government repealed sections of the banking laws in the late 1990s, and Government protected its big bank political donors with cash from taxpayers, and the taxpayers suffered again.

14.2.1.2. I cannot concede that the same holds for the ACA in that its structuring, as stated in President Obama’s response to me “Because of the Affordable Care Act, millions of Americans finally have access to quality, affordable health insurance.” is for a minority vs a majority. U.S. DHHS released numbers on 07-Jan-2016 that a total of 11.3 million enrolled. U.S. Population is 323.8 million. That results in only 3.5% of Americans participating in the plan.

14.2.1.2.1. The religion of Islam’s Sharia Code of Economics states that, “All Muslims who live above the subsistence level must pay an annual alms, known as zakat. This is not charity, but
rather an obligation owed by the eligible Muslim to the poor of the community. I think this holds very applicable to what the ACA is intended to do in providing for health care for those who can’t afford it and penalizing those for not participating. Furthermore, considering the failure of President Obama to identify the actions of the Fundamental Sunni Sharia Islamic Code Fighters, as Radical Muslim Terrorists et al, the ACA has overtones of the Sharia Law of economics from a Socialist who has a background related to Islam. See Exhibits 20, 21, & 22 for additional overtones of President Obama and his actions in support of Islamic elements et al. Is not one of the Democrats in the presidential primary election a declared socialist? This also relates to my arguments about the party of the Democrats being a collation party.

14.2.2. Second, the principle or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion.

14.2.2.1. I argue here and have argued so previously that the ACA and the Social Security Act protect some religions by providing “The exception for certain grandfathered church plans”, while denying others or forcing them to comply with the tenets of these grandfathered church plans and a new islamic plan.

14.2.2.2. I argue that both the ACA and the Social Security Act fail this second part of the “Lemon Test”.

14.2.3. Third, the statute or policy must not result in an "excessive entanglement" of government with religion.

14.2.3.1. I argue here and have argued so previously that the ACA and the Social Security Act protect some religions by providing “The exception for certain grandfathered church plans”, while denying others or forcing them to comply with the tenets of these grandfathered church plans and a new islamic sharia socio-economic plan.

14.2.3.2. I argue that both the ACA and the Social Security Act fail this third part of the “Lemon Test”.

14.2.4. Failure to meet any of these criteria is a proof that the statute or policy in question violates the Establishment Clause.

14.2.4.1. I argue here because the ACA and the Social Security Act fail the second and third parts of the “Lemon Test” that they both violate the Establishment Clause and should be declared unconstitutional.


15.1. This is a case of denial of unemployment benefits because of the free practice of religious beliefs of a woman from the Seventh-Day Adventist Church in South Carolina who would not work on Saturdays. The State of South Carolina denied her claim to unemployment benefits.
The Supreme Court of the United States upheld her right to the free practice of her religious beliefs and that she was due the unemployment benefits.

15.1.1. This case in my opinion is very much a conjugate of my case, except it is the Federal Government that seeks to deny my benefits, and more so, in addition to denying my benefits, fine me for non-participation, and then take away my benefits if I win exemption.

15.2. MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court. The following are excerpts from that opinion:

15.2.1. I


15.2.1.2. “The door of the Free Exercise Clause stands tightly closed against any governmental regulation of religious beliefs” with emphasis on “any”. The ACA and secondarily the Social Security Act goes against this very ruling of the SCOTUS justifying my claim that the ACA and Social Security Act violate the Establishment Clause and my free exercise of my religious beliefs and practices. It uses taxing power to penalize me for non-participation on the grounds of my religious beliefs. And this is further substantiation of my request for relief for return of payments related to the ACA and the Social Security Act at a rate of return based on the DOW, and declaring both ACA and the Social Security Act unconstitutional.

15.2.2. II

15.2.2.1. We turn first to the question whether the disqualification for benefits imposes any burden on the free exercise of appellant’s religion. We think it is clear that it does. In a sense, the consequences of such a disqualification to religious principles and practices may be only an indirect result of welfare legislation within the State's general competence to enact; it is true that no criminal sanctions directly compel appellant to work a six-day week. But this is only the beginning, not the end, of our (Page 374 U. S. 404) inquiry. [Footnote 5] For "'[i]f the purpose or effect of a law is to impede the observance of one or all religions or is to discriminate invidiously between religions, that law is constitutionally invalid even though the burden may be characterized as being only indirect.'"

15.2.2.1.1. SCOTUS ruled that the disqualification for benefits imposes a burden on the free exercise of religion. I argue that because my complaint closely parallels this case that a similar
ruling in my case can be expected should my case go all the way to the SCOTUS because what the Administrative branch of the Federal Government zealously seeks to protect is the ruling party, the Democrats and their coalition style of vote garnering. And this is further substantiation of my request for relief for return of payments related to the ACA and the Social Security Act at a rate of return based on the DOW, and having both the ACA and the Social Security Act declared unconstitutional.

15.2.2.2. Braunfeld v. Brown, supra, at 366 U. S. 607. Here, not only is it apparent that appellant's declared ineligibility for benefits derives solely from the practice of her religion, but the pressure upon her to forego that practice is unmistakable. The ruling forces her to choose between following the precepts of her religion and forfeiting benefits, on the one hand, and abandoning one of the precepts of her religion in order to accept work, on the other hand. Governmental imposition of such a choice puts the same kind of burden upon the free exercise of religion as would a fine imposed against appellant for her Saturday worship.

15.2.2.2.1. I argue that this fits exactly to what is being imposed on me by the ACA and secondarily the Social Security Act. However, in my case the governmental imposed pressure is greater and escalated because of the fine imposed by the ACA and the fine increasing each year for my non-participation. And this is further substantiation of my request for relief for return of payments related to the ACA and the Social Security Act at a rate of return based on the DOW, and having both the ACA and the Social Security Act declared unconstitutional.

15.2.2.3. Nor may the South Carolina court's construction of the statute be saved from constitutional infirmity on the ground that unemployment compensation benefits are not appellant's "right," but merely a "privilege." It is too late in the day to doubt that the liberties of religion and expression may be infringed by the denial of or placing of conditions upon a benefit or privilege. [Footnote 6] American (Page 374 U. S. 405) Communications Assn. v. Douds, 339 U. S. 382, 339 U. S. 390; Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U. S. 183, 344 U. S. 191-192; Hannegan v. Esquire, Inc., 327 U. S. 146, 327 U. S. 155-156. For example, in Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U. S. 603, 363 U. S. 611, the Court recognized with respect to Federal Social Security benefits that "[t]he interest of a covered employee under the Act is of sufficient substance to fall within the protection from arbitrary governmental action afforded by the Due Process Clause."

15.2.2.3.1. Substituting “Federal Court” for “South Carolina court” for application to my case: “Nor may the Federal Court’s construction of the statute be saved from constitutional infirmity on the ground that Social Security Benefits unemployment compensation are not appellant's "right," but merely a "privilege." It is too late in the day to doubt that the liberties of religion and expression may be infringed by the denial of or placing of conditions upon a benefit or privilege." And this is further substantiation of my request for relief for return of payments related to the ACA and the FICA at a rate of return based on the DOW, and having both the ACA and the Social Security Act declared unconstitutional.
15.2.3.2. How is it that these rules by SCOTUS are lost on the Congress and President of these United States?

15.2.3.2.1. I can argue that it is because of their egregious dereliction of Ministerial Duty in protecting and defending our Constitution of the United States of America.

15.2.3.2.2. I can also argue that the governmental interest here is political for the interest of one party, the Democrats, to protect certain small interest groups of individuals so that, that party can garner votes, all be it subtly and maybe indirectly, and control the government.

15.2.3.2.3. I further argue that the above items are criminal in nature when it comes to protecting our Republic and for which it Stands. Thus, I filed a criminal complaint with the Federal Government pursuant to their requirements, but there has been no response. This just shows that the Administrative party of the Democrats picks and chooses, discriminates, which citizens it will protect under the Constitution. IE: the protection of Hillary Clinton in the death of four of her subordinates in Benghazi, see ARB on Embassy Bombings in 1998 assigning Personal Responsibility to the Secretary of State for the protection of subordinates, and her email Scandal with the AG meeting with Bill and the FBI completing the investigation and making the ruling not to pursue charges, they make recommendations, but the final decision is never left in their hands. So the very thing, discrimination, they claim to fight against is the very thing they use to build their coalition for government control. Attacking NC on Transgender use of bathrooms is another example. (7) See Exhibit 27 for another example!! Google DOJ v cities on islam for more examples!!

15.2.3.4. In Speiser v. Randall, 357 U. S. 513, we emphasized that conditions upon public benefits cannot be sustained if they so operate, whatever their purpose, a to inhibit or deter the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. We there struck down a condition which limited the availability of a tax exemption to those members of the exempted class who affirmed their loyalty to the state government granting the exemption. While the State was surely under no obligation to afford such an exemption, we held that the imposition of such a condition upon even a gratuitous benefit inevitably deterred or discouraged the exercise of First Amendment rights of expression, and thereby threatened to "produce a result which the State could not command directly." 357 U.S. (Page 374 U. S. 406) at 357 U. S. 526. "To deny an exemption to claimants who engage in certain forms of speech is, in effect, to penalize them for such speech." Id. at 357 U. S. 518. Likewise, to condition the availability of benefits upon this appellant's willingness to violate a cardinal principle of her religious faith effectively penalizes the free exercise of her constitutional liberties.

15.2.3.4.1. I argue that this is another case, that is within the first case supporting my claim, that also supports my claim clearly and definitively: "we emphasized that conditions upon public benefits cannot be sustained if they so operate, whatever their purpose, a to inhibit or deter the exercise of First Amendment freedoms." And this is further substantiation of my
request for relief for return of payments related to the ACA and the Social Security Act at a rate of return based on the DOW, and having both ACA and Social Security Act declared unconstitutional.

15.2.3. III

15.2.3.1. We must next consider whether some compelling state interest enforced in the eligibility provisions of the South Carolina statute justifies the substantial infringement of appellant’s First Amendment right. It is basic that no showing merely of a rational relationship to some colorable state interest would suffice; in this highly sensitive constitutional area, "[o]nly the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests, give occasion for permissible limitation," Thomas v. Collins, 323 U. S. 516, 323 U. S. 530.

15.2.3.1.1. I argue that there are no gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests, giving occasion for permissible limitation by the ACA and secondarily the Social Security Act for the substantial infringements placed on my religious beliefs and practices by these two laws.

15.2.3.1.2. Thus, I further argue this is additional substantiation of my request for relief for return of payments related to the ACA and the Social Security Act at a rate of return based on the DOW, and having both ACA and the Social Security Act declared unconstitutional.

15.2.3.2. (Page 374 U. S. 407) No such abuse or danger has been advanced in the present case. The appellees suggest no more than a possibility that the filing of fraudulent claims by unscrupulous claimants feigning religious objections to Saturday work might not only dilute the unemployment compensation fund, ... -- it is highly doubtful whether such evidence would be sufficient to warrant a substantial infringement of religious liberties. For even if the possibility of spurious claims did threaten to dilute the fund and disrupt the scheduling of work, it would plainly be incumbent upon the appellees to demonstrate that no alternative forms of regulation would combat such abuses without infringing First Amendment rights. [Footnote 7] Cf. 364 U. S. Tucker, 364 U.S. (Page 374 U. S. 408)479, 364 U. S. 487-490; Talley v. California, 362 U. S. 60, 362 U. S. 64; Schneider v. State, 308 U. S. 147, 308 U. S. 161; Martin v. Struthers, 319 U. S. 141, 319 U. S. 144-149.

15.2.3.2.1. My complaint in this case, 3:16-cv-93 seeks compensatory damages imposed on me by the actions of the Federal Government in attempting to substantially infringe on my First Amendment right of Free Exercise of religious Beliefs.

15.2.3.2.2. I do, in my complaint I seek the right to seek other damages from those directly responsible for violating my First Amendment right of Free Exercise of Beliefs: These individuals being Senators, Representatives of the Federal Government and the President of the United States and the heads of his Administration. Because their actions are violations of Ministerial Duties vs Discretionary Duties, I argue there is a non-applicability of “Absolute Immunity”, see
Exhibit 19. In the later parts of my PLAINTIFF’S DETAILED PLEADINGS 4 FREEDOM I justify a basis for asking for those damages as part of this case; I set the basis for the actual damages; and then I ask for those damages.

15.2.4. IV

15.2.4.1. In holding as we do, plainly we are not fostering the "establishment" of the Seventh-day Adventist religion in South Carolina, for the extension of unemployment benefits to Sabbatarians in common with Sunday worshippers reflects nothing more than the governmental obligation of neutrality in the face of religious differences, and does not represent that involvement of religious with secular institutions which it is the object of the Establishment Clause to forestall.

15.2.4.1.1. I am seeking the Federal Government’s “obligation of neutrality” as required by the Establishment Clause in the face of my Free Exercise of religious Beliefs, which in this case SCOTUS upheld and reinforced with this paragraph.

15.2.4.2. This holding but reaffirms a principle that we announced a decade and a half ago, namely that no State may "exclude individual Catholics, Lutherans, Mohammedans, Baptists, Jews, Methodists, Non-believers, Presbyterians, or the members of any other faith, because of their faith, or lack of it, from receiving the benefits of public welfare legislation."

15.2.4.2.1. I am arguing here that “the Federal Government cannot” can be substituted for “no State may” in this paragraph and that I should be granted the compensatory damages of loss of benefits of the Social Security Act a semi-public welfare legislation as it stood at the date of the filing of my complaint, as I’m not the party seeking to receive something I’m not deserving of, but I’m the party seeking protection from a Federal Law that seeks to take benefits away from me if I do not conform to the Federal Government’s structure, definition, and time conformance of acceptable tenets of religious belief, or pay the islamic based zakat tax penalty for nonparticipation, which I argue creates an excessive entanglement of the government with religion and violates the “Establishment Clause” of the First Amendment of the Constitution of the United States.

15.2.5. [Footnote 5] (Related to 9).3.1 Above)

15.2.5.1. In a closely analogous context, this Court said: "... the fact that no direct restraint or punishment is imposed upon speech or assembly does not determine the free speech question. Under some circumstances, indirect 'discouragements' undoubtedly have the same coercive effect upon the exercise of First Amendment rights as imprisonment, fines, injunctions or taxes. A requirement that adherents of particular religious faiths or political parties wear identifying arm-bands, for example, is obviously of this nature." American Communications Assn. v. Douds, 339 U. S. 382, 339 U. S. 402. Cf. Smith v. California, 361 U. S. 147, 361 U. S. 153-155.
15.2.5.1.1. I argue here that the requirements under the ACA and the Social Security Act are much more than indirect, but are coercive and direct with the loss of Social Security Act benefits, and ACA penalties if I don’t conform.

15.2.5.1.2. I further argue, that the suggestion here that indirect acts have the same coercive effect, and that the coercive effect can be applied in a suggestive positive manner by a political party as I argued supra, I argue that they can also be a suggestive negative manner as Obama does in his book “AUDACITY of HOPE ....”, with is presidential voice and actions. I further argue that the governmental interest here is political for the interest of one party, the Democrats, to protect certain small interest groups of individuals so that, that party can garner votes, all be it subtly and maybe indirectly, and control the government. Thus further substantiating the Relief Requested of having the entire ACA and the Social Security Act ruled unconstitutional.

15.2.6. [Footnote 6] (Related to 9).3.3. Above)


15.2.6.1.1. This just supports my arguments that the Federal Governments conditions on Religious Exemption in the ACA and secondarily the Social Security Act should be invalidated and that my request for relief for return of payments related to the ACA and the Social Security Act at a rate of return based on the DOW should be awarded.

15.2.7. [Footnote 7] (Related to 9)4.2. Above)

15.2.7.1. We note that, before the instant decision, state supreme courts had, without exception, granted benefits to persons who were physically available for work but unable to find suitable employment solely because of a religious prohibition against Saturday work. E.g., In re Miller, 243 N.C. 509, 91 S.E.2d 241; Swenson v. Michigan Employment Security Comm’n, 340 Mich. 430, 65 N.W.2d 709; Tary v. Board of Review, 161 Ohio St. 251, 119 N.E.2d 56. Cf. Kut v. Albers Super Markets, Inc., 146 Ohio St. 522, 66 N.E.2d 643, appeal dismissed sub nom. Kut v.
Bureau of Unemployment Compensation, 329 U.S. 669. One author has observed, "the law was settled that conscientious objections to work on the Sabbath made such work unsuitable, and that such objectors were nevertheless available for work. . . . A contrary opinion would make the unemployment compensation law unconstitutional as a violation of freedom of religion. Religious convictions, strongly held, are so impelling as to constitute good cause for refusal. Since availability refers to suitable work, religious observers were not unavailable because they excluded Sabbath work."

15.2.7.1.1. This just provides further support that I should receive the compensatory damages sought in my complaint.

15.2.7.2. Altman, Availability for Work: A Study in Unemployment Compensation (1950), 187. See also Sanders, Disqualification for Unemployment Insurance, 8 Vand.L.Rev. 307, 327-328 (1955); 34 N.C.L.Rev. 591 (1956); cf. Freeman, Able To Work and Available for Work, 55 Yale L.J. 123, 131 (1945). Of the 47 States which have eligibility provisions similar to those of the South Carolina statute, only 28 appear to have given administrative rulings concerning the eligibility of persons whose religious convictions prevented them from accepting available work. Twenty-two of those States have held such persons entitled to benefits, although apparently only one such decision rests exclusively upon the federal constitutional ground which constitutes the basis of our decision. See 111 U. of Pa.L.Rev. 253, and n. 3 (1962); 34 N.C.L.Rev. 591, 602, n. 60 (1956).

15.2.7.2.1. As our nation is a nation of united States; and of the people, by the people, for the people from those States, it is noted that in this referenced study that 22 of 28, or 78.6%, a substantial majority, of the States with similar cases to mine have ruled in favor that persons are entitled to benefits. It is then argued that the people of these same states that send Legislators to the Federal Government to act on their behalf would expect those Federal Legislative members to act and support their state positions. Thus, by this majority basis that Federal Legislators and the fact that the Supreme Court has established in Helvering vs. Davis (1937) and Flemming v. Nestor (1960) that Federal Legislators and the President have power to control the disposition of government programs that the compensatory damages of loss of benefits of the Social Security Act imposed by the ACA Religious Exemption requirements should be due and owing to me as listed and detailed.


16.1. This is a case of attempted forced participation in State Government Requirements Against Ones Religious Beliefs. It is argued that not related to benefits directly, it is related to my case on the basis of it being referenced in the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, and that in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) also referenced in the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act of 1993, direct or subtle attempts by the Federal Government to force participation in Government Programs has been rendered unconstitutional by SCOTUS.

16.2. MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER delivered the opinion of the Court. The following are excerpts from that opinion:

16.2.1. On complaint of the school district administrator for the public schools, respondents were charged, tried, and convicted of violating the compulsory attendance law in Green County Court, and were fined the sum of $5 each. [Footnote 3] Respondents defended on the ground that the application (Page 406 U. S. 209) of the compulsory attendance law violated their rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.

16.2.1.1. It is argued that the fine here for non-participation is just like the fine applied in the ACA for non-participation without an approved exemption. In my complaint I’m excluded from an approved exemption because of the unconstitutional nature of the ACA Religious Exemption qualifications. It is noted that in this case the conviction of violating the law was overturned. I would argue that my case would receive the same opinion from SCOTUS as did the Wisconsin Supreme Court in this case: See next excerpt.

16.2.2. The Wisconsin Supreme Court, however, sustained respondents' claim under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, and reversed the convictions. A majority of the court was of the opinion that the State had failed to make an adequate showing that its interest in "establishing and maintaining an educational system overrides the defendants' right to the free exercise of their religion." 49 Wis.2d 430, 447, 182 N.W.2d 539, 547 (1971).

16.2.2.1. It is argued that this is similar to supra where State Courts ruled in favor of individuals over state law relative the Free Exercise of Religion.

16.2.3. I

16.2.3.1. Yet even this paramount responsibility was, in Pierce, made to yield to the right of parents to provide an equivalent education in a privately operated system. There, the Court held that Oregon's statute compelling attendance in a public school from age eight to age 16 unreasonably interfered with the interest of parents in directing the rearing of their offspring, including their education in church-operated schools. As that case suggests, the values of parental direction of the religious upbringing (Page 406 U. S. 214) and education of their children in their early and formative years have a high place in our society.

16.2.3.1.1. It is argued that because my case deals only with an individual’s Free Exercise of Religious Practice and does not involve any minors as in this case, the threshold for supporting my claims should be less than this case and thus it can be argued that the Federal Courts at all levels should be supportive of my claim and my requested Relief, at least for the Compensatory Damages.
16.2.3.2. It follows that, in order for Wisconsin to compel school attendance beyond the eighth grade against a claim that such attendance interferes with the practice of a legitimate religious belief, it must appear either that the State does not deny the free exercise of religious belief by its requirement or that there is a state interest of sufficient magnitude to override the interest claiming protection under the Free Exercise Clause. Long before there was general acknowledgment of the need for universal formal education, the Religion Clauses had specifically and firmly fixed the right to free exercise of religious beliefs, and buttressing this fundamental right was an equally firm, even if less explicit, prohibition against the establishment of any religion by government. The values underlying these two provisions relating to religion have been zealously protected, sometimes even at the expense of other interests of admittedly high social importance.

16.2.3.2.1. I argue that I should be afforded the same zealous protection the Judiciary has afforded to others in the past, even more so because the foundation of my claim has a lower impact on “other interests of admittedly high social importance”.

16.2.3.3. The essence of all that has been said and written on the subject is that only those interests of the highest order and those not otherwise served can overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion. We can accept it as settled, therefore, that, however strong the State's interest in universal compulsory education, it is by no means absolute to the exclusion or subordination of all other interests. E.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U. S. 398 (1963); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U. S. 420, 366 U. S. 459 (1961) (separate opinion of Frankfurter, J.); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U. S. 158, 321 U. S. 165 (1944).

16.2.3.3.1. I argue that I should be afforded the same zealous protection the Judiciary has afforded to others in the past, even more so because the foundation of my claim has a lower impact of magnitudes not even comparable to the highest order interests of social importance such as mandatory vaccinations for children. It is noted that even this highest order interest of social importance is under attack in our courts because of a minority that fears unproven connections to medical disorders.

16.2.4. II

16.2.4.1. ...to have the protection of the Religion Clauses, the claims must be rooted in religious belief. Although a determination of what is a "religious" belief or practice entitled to constitutional protection may present a most delicate question, [Footnote 6] the very concept of ordered liberty precludes (Page 406 U. S. 216) allowing every person to make his own standards on matters of conduct in which society as a whole has important interests.

16.2.4.1.1. I argue that my beliefs do not cause matters of conduct that puts others at risk. I further argue that my claims are rooted in my beliefs, and I have provided further supporting documentation as to those beliefs. I further argue that my tenets of my beliefs were
established long before to the writing, passing, and signing of the ACA. And I again argue, that the foundation of my claim has a lower impact of magnitudes not even comparable to the highest order interests of social importance.

16.2.4.2. Giving no weight to such secular considerations, however, we see that the record in this case abundantly supports the claim that the traditional way of life of the Amish is not merely a matter of personal preference, but one of deep religious conviction, shared by an organized group, and intimately related to daily living.

16.2.4.2.1. I argue that, though I am the lead person for my beliefs and establishment of the tenets of those beliefs, I am not alone in rejecting organized religion as shown supra and restated here:

16.2.4.2.1.1. Citation: AllAboutGOD.com PO Box 507 Peyton, Colorado 80831: All About History “Separation of Church and State”. Excerpt from their “About Us”: “Although we reject man- made religion, we consider the personal pursuit of God as paramount in each of our personal life journeys. We also believe that ultimate, saving Truth is found only through God’s Son, Jesus Christ.”

16.2.4.2.1.2. And I to reject man-made religion and thus the structure of the tenets of my beliefs shared in the complaint as Exhibits 1 & 2! However, I do not believe that JESUS CHRIST was, is, and ever shall be the literal “son of GOD”, but that the CHRIST of 2000+ years ago was GOD, HIMSELF, in the FLESH walking amongst HIS Children to return them to HIM one on ONE, face to FACE, in HIS PROCESS OF ANCIENT OF DAYS ISRAEL. My beliefs are solely based on the TEACHINGS of GOD, that it is a one on ONE relationship that GOD SEEKS with each of us, without interference or hindrance from anyone or anything, such as tenets established and/or defined by women or men.

16.2.4.2.1.3. And an excerpt from a CRUX article on PEW Research by CRUX’s National Reporter Michael O’Loughlin 12-May-2015 title “PEW survey: Percentage of US Catholics drops and Catholicism is losing members faster that any denomination”: “The big winner in terms of growing numbers is the unaffiliated, or the so-called “nones,” shooting up to about 23 percent of the total population from just 16 percent seven years ago. The 56 million adults not belonging to any faith tradition outnumber both Catholics and mainline Protestants; only the Evangelical Christians comprise a larger share of the population.” Therefore, the relief I’m seeking relative to the unconstitutionality of the ACA and the FICA is not limited to me but potentially a substantial portion of the U.S. population.

16.2.4.3. The impact of the compulsory attendance law on respondents' practice of the Amish religion is not only severe, but inescapable, for the Wisconsin law affirmatively compels them, under threat of criminal sanction, to perform acts undeniably at odds with fundamental tenets of their religious beliefs. See Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U. S. 599, 366 U. S. 605 (1961). Nor is the
impact of the compulsory attendance law confined to grave interference with important Amish religious tenets from a subjective point of view. It carries with it precisely the kind of objective danger to the free exercise of religion that the First Amendment was designed to prevent.

16.2.4.3.1. I argue that Federal Government’s actions relative to Religious Exemption in the ACA and secondarily the Social Security Act are severe and compels under threat (coercion) of the Social Security Act benefits sanction to perform acts undeniably at odds with my fundamental religious beliefs and practices. I further argue that the Federal Government’s actions relative to Religious Exemption in the ACA and secondarily the Social Security Act creates an excessive entanglement with religion and “carries with it precisely the kind of objective danger to the free exercise of religion that the First Amendment was designed to prevent.”

16.2.5. III

16.2.5.1. But our decisions have rejected the idea that (Page 406 U. S. 220) religiously grounded conduct is always outside the protection of the Free Exercise Clause. It is true that activities of individuals, even when religiously based, are often subject to regulation by the States in the exercise of their undoubted power to promote the health, safety, and general welfare, or the Federal Government in the exercise of its delegated powers. See, e.g., Gillette v. United States, 401 U. S. 437 (1971); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U. S. 599 (1961); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U. S. 158 (1944); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U. S. 145 (1879). But to agree that religiously grounded conduct must often be subject to the broad police power of the State is not to deny that there are areas of conduct protected by the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, and thus beyond the power of the State to control, even under regulations of general applicability. E.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U. S. 398 (1963); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U. S. 105 (1943); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 310 U. S. 303-304 (1940). This case, therefore, does not become easier because respondents were convicted for their "actions" in refusing to send their children to the public high school; in this context, belief and action cannot be neatly confined in logic-tight compartments. Cf. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S.S. at 403 U. S. 612.

16.2.5.1.1. I argue that nothing in my religious tenets, beliefs, and practices put at risk health, safety, and general welfare of the general public of the United States of America or the delegated powers of the Federal Government, and that my beliefs and conduct should be protected from excessive entanglement of government and religion and by the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.

16.2.5.2.1. I argue that in application of the Religious Exemption requirements of the ACA and
the Social Security Act though intended to protect one group, the Old Order of the Amish, it in
fact has given rise to excessive entanglement of government and religion, supra, and is unduly
burdening the free exercise of religious beliefs in my case.

16.2.5.3. By preserving doctrinal flexibility and recognizing the need for a sensible and realistic
application of the Religion Clauses, "we have been able to chart a course that preserved the
autonomy and freedom of religious bodies while avoiding any semblance of established
religion. This is a 'tight rope,' and one we have successfully traversed."

16.2.5.3.1. I argue that even though the SCOTUS has traversed the “tight rope” balance of
protection of Free Exercise of Religious Beliefs successfully, it is the failure of the Congress and
President to execute their Ministerial Duty in supporting, protecting, and upholding the
Constitution and the actions of the SCOTUS that have brought us to this litigation. And this is
why I argue for the relief against those responsible, Congressional Members who voted for the
ACA and President who signed the ACA, and others for infringing on my religious beliefs and
practices and unduly burdening me with loss of my Social Security Act benefits, and financially
penalizing me for non-participation in the ACA with the islamic zakat tax.

16.2.5.4. The Congress itself recognized their self-sufficiency by authorizing exemption of such
groups as the Amish from the obligation to pay social security taxes. [Footnote 11]

16.2.5.4.1. I argue, that in so doing Congress and the President entered into excessive
entanglement with religion and also eliminated the possibility for future Free Exercise of
Religious Belief exemptions by limiting that the documented religious tenets had to exist as of
the end of 1950 and unduly favored structured religion over all others, and with the ACA they
extended that entanglement even further by including an islamic zakat tax for nonparticipation.

16.2.5.5. We must not forget that, in the Middle Ages, important values of the civilization of the
Western World were preserved by members of religious orders who isolated themselves from
all worldly influences against great obstacles. There can be no assumption that today's majority
is (Page 406 U. S. 224) "right," and the Amish and others like them are "wrong." A way of life
that is odd or even erratic but interferes with no rights or interests of others is not to be
condemned because it is different.

16.2.5.5.1. I argue, that the restrictive religious tenets under the ACA and the Social Security Act
create an excessive entanglement of government and religion and along with the penalties
under the ACA in affect act as condemnation of my beliefs because they are different. I further
argue that for the Judiciary not #to grant me all relief sought in my case would also in affect act
as condemnation of my beliefs; the Establishment Clause; and the Free Exercise Clause: our
Constitution can only be condemned by Amendment or national defeat in war, noting that the
Declaration of Independence holds tight to the necessity of Revolution if it the Federal
Government usurpations become to many and go too far, as it was with the crown for our First Revolution.

16.2.5.5.2. I also argue, that the corollary to “There can be no assumption that today's majority is ‘right,’ “ is: There can be no assumption that I’m, as a single minority, am “wrong”. And therefore, because nothing in my religious tenets, beliefs, and practices put at risk health, safety, and general welfare of the general public or the delegated powers and Ministerial Duties of the Federal Government, that my beliefs and conduct should be protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments of our Constitution and I be granted all of the Relief I seek in my case.

16.2.6. IV

16.2.6.1. (Page 406 U. S. 230) Court's severe characterization of the evils that it thought the legislature could legitimately associate with child labor, even when performed in the company of an adult. 321 U.S. at 321 U. S. 169-170. The Court later took great care to confine Prince to a narrow scope in Sherbert v. Verner, when it stated: "On the other hand, the Court has rejected challenges under the Free Exercise Clause to governmental regulation of certain overt acts prompted by religious beliefs or principles, for 'even when the action is in accord with one's religious convictions, [it] is not totally free from legislative restrictions.' Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U. S. 599, 366 U. S. 603. The conduct or actions so regulated have invariably posed some substantial threat to public safety, peace or order. See, e.g., Reynolds v. United States, 98 U. S. 145; Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U. S. 11; Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U. S. 158. . . ."

16.2.6.1.1. I argue that my beliefs, tenets, and practices create no threat to public safety, peace, or order. In fact, should the “nones” adopt my beliefs, tenets, and practices there is likely to be greater public safety, peace, and order because there are no tenets of rigid religious obedience that require it to be defended radically with aggressive physical force.

16.2.6.2. As often heretofore pointed out, rights guaranteed by the Constitution may not be abridged by legislation which has no reasonable relation to some purpose within the competency of the State. The fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments in this Union repose excludes any general power of the State to standardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers only. The child is not the mere creature of the State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations."

16.2.6.2.1. I argue that I am a child of GOD’S making, by being STRIVEN by GOD in HIS PROCESS of ANCIENT OF DAYS ISRAEL, and therefore as I am STRIVEN by GOD I have the right and high duty to prepare myself for the obligations under GOD, and that obligation is protected by First and Fourteenth Amendments of our Constitution of the United States of America.
16.2.6.3. And, when the interests of parenthood are combined with a free exercise claim of the nature revealed by this record, more than merely a "reasonable relation to some purpose within the competency of the State" is required to sustain the validity of the State's requirement under the First Amendment.

16.2.6.3.1. I argue that there is no "reasonable relation to some purpose within the competency of" the Federal Government in the ACA and secondarily the Social Security Act and thus I should be granted all Relief that I seek.

16.2.6.4. In the face of our consistent emphasis on the central values underlying the Religion Clauses in our constitutional scheme of government, we cannot accept a parens patriae [government as legal protector of citizens unable to protect themselves] claim of such all-encompassing scope and with such sweeping potential for broad and unforeseeable application as that urged by the State.

16.2.6.4.1. I think it can be argued, and I do so, that for my case "Federal Government" can be substituted for "state" and that the Federal Government under the ACA and the Social Security Act seek to be the legal protector of citizens, of which the majority are able to protect themselves. Just consider the near $20 Trillion indebtedness of our Federal Government and all the discussion of the Social Security Act insolvency for the past 30 years. I further argue that in the above paragraph SCOTUS does not accept this parens patriae action of the government and thus I should be granted all Relief I seek in my case.

16.2.7. V

16.2.7.1. For the reasons stated we hold, with the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, that the First and Fourteenth Amendments prevent the State from compelling respondents to cause their children to attend formal high school to age 16. [Footnote 22]

16.2.7.1.1. I think it can be argued, and I do so, that for my case that the First and Fourteenth Amendments prevent the Federal Government from compelling me and others for participation in the ACA and the Social Security Act and thus I should be granted all Relief I seek in my case.

16.2.8. Footnotes Referenced Above in the Original Opinion

16.2.8.1. [Footnote 3] (Related to 16.2.1. Above)

16.2.8.1.1. Prior to trial, the attorney for respondents wrote the State Superintendent of Public Instruction in an effort to explore the possibilities for a compromise settlement. Among other possibilities, he suggested that perhaps the State Superintendent could administratively determine that the Amish could satisfy the compulsory attendance law by establishing their own vocational training plan similar to one that has been established in Pennsylvania. Supp.App. 6. Under the Pennsylvania plan, Amish children of high school age are required to
attend an Amish vocational school for three hours a week, during which time they are taught
such subjects as English, mathematics, health, and social studies by an Amish teacher. For the
balance of the week, the children perform farm and household duties under parental
supervision, and keep a journal of their daily activities. The major portion of the curriculum is
home projects in agriculture and homemaking. See generally J. Hostetler & G. Huntington,
Children in Amish Society: Socialization and Community Education, c. 5 (1971). A similar
program has been instituted in Indiana. Ibid. See also Iowa Code § 299.24 (1971); Kan.Stat.Ann.
§ 72-1111 (Supp. 1971).

16.2.8.1.2. The Superintendent rejected this proposal on the ground that it would not afford
Amish children "substantially equivalent education" to that offered in the schools of the area.

16.2.8.1.3. See Exhibit 11 for my attempts to resolve this with petitions to the Government
and others for a redress of grievances prior to filing my complaint. There were only two
respondents, both of non-action, Senator Heidi Heitkamp, and President Obama. Their
responses are included in the Exhibit referenced herein. I also filed a Criminal Complaint with
the DOJ and FBI in accord with the DOJ's requirements for a case of my type and the FBI did not
respond and the DOJ only responded generically as argued previously.

16.2.8.2. [Footnote 6] (Related to 16.2.4.1. Above)

concurring in result); United States v. Ballard, 322 U. S. 78 (1944).

16.2.8.2.2. This is another case upholding the protection of Free Exercise of Religious Beliefs
over the Government imposing on that Free Exercise. This is just more SCOTUS case support
for my complaint and all the relief I am seeking.

16.2.8.3. [Footnote 11] (Related to 16.2.5.4. Above)

16.2.8.3.1. Title 26 U.S.C. § 1402(h) authorizes the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare
to exempt members of "a recognized religious sect" existing at all times since December 31,
1950, from the obligation to pay social security taxes if they are, by reason of the tenets of their
sect, opposed to receipt of such benefits and agree to waive them, provided the Secretary finds
that the sect makes reasonable provision for its dependent members. The history of the
exemption shows it was enacted with the situation of the Old Order Amish specifically in view.

16.2.8.3.1.1. My argument here is the same as supra restated here: I argue, that in so doing
Congress and the President entered into Excessive Entanglement with recognized religious
sects and also eliminated the possibility for future Free Exercise of Religious Belief exemptions
by limiting that the documented religious tenets had to exist as of the end of 1950.
16.2.8.3.1.2. I further argue, that in so doing Congress and the President also violated the Establishment Clause by limiting that the documented religious tenets had to exist as of the end of 1950. And the last sentence of the above footnote paragraph further supports this argument of violation of the Establishment Clause in that it was enacted specifically related to protect the Old Order Amish and now expanded with the ACA including islamic economic codes of zakat.

16.2.8.3.1.3. I further argue that this violates mine and anybody else’s right to Free Exercise of Religious beliefs in both developing new beliefs and practicing those beliefs and that all the relief that I’m seeking in my case should be granted with emphasis on the Relief against those responsible for the civil rights violations; the Unconstitutionality of the ACA, and the Unconstitutionality of the Social Security Act.

16.2.8.3.2. The record in this case establishes without contradiction that the Green County Amish had never been known to commit crimes, that none had been known to receive public assistance, and that none was unemployed.

16.2.8.3.2.1. I argue that all of this paragraph also applies to me, disregarding a few speeding tickets.

16.2.8.4. [Footnote 22] (Related to 16.2.7.1. Above)

16.2.8.4.1. What we have said should meet the suggestion that the decision of the Wisconsin Supreme Court recognizing an exemption for the Amish from the State's system of compulsory education constituted an impermissible establishment of religion. In Walz v. Tax Commission, the Court saw the three main concerns against which the Establishment Clause sought to protect as "sponsorship, financial support, and active involvement of the sovereign in religious activity." 397 U. S. 664, 397 U. S. 668 (1970). Accommodating the religious beliefs of the Amish can hardly be characterized as sponsorship or active involvement. The purpose and effect of such an exemption are not to support, favor, advance, or assist the Amish, but to allow their centuries-old religious society, here long before the advent of any compulsory education, to survive free from the heavy impediment compliance with the Wisconsin compulsory education law would impose. Such an accommodation "reflects nothing more than the governmental obligation of neutrality in the face of religious differences, and does not represent that involvement of religious with secular institutions which it is the object of the Establishment Clause to forestall." Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U. S. 398, 374 U. S. 409 (1963).

16.2.8.4.1.1. I think it can be argued, and I do so, that the ACA and the Social Security Act meet the first two main concerns against which the Establishment Clause seeks to protect, that being "sponsorship", using the Old Order Amish tenets and time basis as the test for Religious Exemption and inclusion of islamic economic zakat code are sponsorship, and “financial support”, by restricting the tenets structure to the Old Order Amish and allowing them exemption over others, which means they don’t have to pay the ACA and the Social Security Act
taxes is financial support, because it gives them more funds than would otherwise be available to them, “the sovereign in religious activity”. Furthermore the ACA makes me pay for not participating through the zakat penalty tax. I further argue for my case that the First and Fourteenth Amendments prevent the Federal Government from compelling me to participate in the ACA and the Social Security Act because of this, and thus I should be granted all Relief I seek.

16.2.8.4.1.2. I further argue that the actions of Congress and the President relative to Title 26 U.S.C. § 1402(g-h) authorizing the Commissioner of Social Security Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare to exempt members of "a recognized religious sect" existing at all times since December 31, 1950 constitutes an impermissible establishment of religion for both the Religious Exemption under the ACA, and secondarily under the Social Security Act and the relief I’m seeking in having both the ACA, and secondarily the Social Security Act declared Unconstitutional should be granted, not just for me but all American’s, specifically the “nones”.

16.2.8.4.1.3. It is further argued that the ACA, and secondarily the Social Security Act be declared Unconstitutional in totality because of the violations of 14TH Amendment related to self-determination and privacy. Both the ACA and secondarily the Social Security Act cross the threshold of the home life of the individual and impose burdensome requirements on the individual as to personal conduct in health and retirement. This argument is supported in the SCOTUS decision in Roe v. Wade 410 U.S. 113 (1973) MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN delivering the opinion of the Court. Excerpts noted below:

16.2.8.4.1.3.1. One's philosophy, one's experiences, one's exposure to the raw edges of human existence, one's religious training, one's attitudes toward life and family and their values, and the moral standards one establishes and seeks to observe, are all likely to influence and to color one's thinking and conclusions about abortion.” I argue that “life” and/or “religions” can be substituted for “abortion” for my case, because the abortion argument is much about the definition of life.

16.2.8.4.1.3.2. We bear in mind, too, Mr. Justice Holmes' admonition in his now-vindicated dissent in Lochner v. New York, 198 U. S. 45, 76 (1905): "[The Constitution] is made for people of fundamentally differing views, and the accident of our finding certain opinions natural and familiar or novel and even shocking ought not to conclude our judgment upon the question whether statutes embodying them conflict with the Constitution of the United States."

16.2.8.4.1.3.2.1. I argue that my beliefs and the exercise of therefore need to be considered with the same broadness, extensiveness, and commitment that SCOTUS used in Roe v. Wade.

16.2.8.4.1.3.3. VIII
16.2.8.4.1.3.3.1. The Constitution does not explicitly mention any right of privacy. In a line of decisions, however, going back perhaps as far as Union Pacific R. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U. S. 250, 251 (1891), the Court has recognized that a right of personal privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy, does exist under the Constitution. In varying contexts, the Court or individual Justices have, indeed, found at least the roots of that right in the First Amendment, Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U. S. 557, 564 (1969); in the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 8-9 (1968), Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347, 350 (1967), Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616 (1886), see Olmstead v. United States, 277 U. S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); in the penumbras of the Bill of Rights, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. at 484-485; in the Ninth Amendment, id. at 486 (Goldberg, J., concurring); or in the concept of liberty guaranteed by the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment, see Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390, 399 (1923). These decisions make it clear that only personal rights that can be deemed "fundamental" or "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty," Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319, 325 (1937), are included in this guarantee of personal privacy. They also make it clear that the right has some extension to activities relating to marriage, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U. S. 1, 12 (1967); procreation, Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U. S. 535, 541-542 (1942); contraception, Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. at 453-454; id. at 460, 463-465 [153](WHITE, J., concurring in result); family relationships, Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U. S. 158, 166 (1944); and childrearing and education, Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510, 535 (1925), Meyer v. Nebraska, supra.

16.2.8.4.1.3.3.1.1. I argue that my beliefs meet the personal rights that should be considered fundamental in the following excerpts from above, “in the concept of liberty guaranteed by the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment. “These decisions make it clear that only personal rights that can be deemed "fundamental" or "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty," Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319, 325 (1937), are included in this guarantee of personal privacy.” I argue that my beliefs are fundamental and do not disrupt the “concept of ordered liberty” and thus are included in this guarantee of personal privacy.

16.2.8.4.1.3.3.2. This right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty and restrictions upon state action, as we feel it is, or, as the District Court determined, in the Ninth Amendment's reservation of rights to the people, is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.

16.2.8.4.1.3.3.2.1. I argue that the “broad enough to encompass” position by SCOTUS should also apply to my case, and thus I should be given the same freedom to my Free Exercise of religion without excessive entanglement and limitation of Federal Statutes.

17. Now let us apply the “Lemon Test”:

17.1. "Lemon Test":
17.1.1. First, the law or policy must have been adopted with a neutral or non-religious purpose.

17.1.1.1. I will concede that this appears to be the case for the Social Security Act in that it was intend to provide financial protection for a majority of American’s after a very dark time in our history, supra. It was part of the “New Deal” supra. However, Consideration and Emphasis is placed on what FDR said about it”

17.1.1.1.1. President Roosevelt strenuously objected to any attempt to introduce general revenue funding into the program. His famous quote on the importance of the payroll taxes was: "We put those payroll contributions there so as to give the contributors a legal, moral, and political right to collect their pensions and unemployment benefits. With those taxes in there, no damn politician can ever scrap my social security program." Schlesinger, Arthur M., Jr., The Age of Roosevelt: The Coming of the New Deal, Houghton Mifflin, 1988 American Heritage Library edition. Pgs. 308-309. Citation: https://www.ssa.gov/history/court.html The 1937 Supreme Court Rulings on the Social Security Act, By Larry DeWitt, SSA Historian, 1999.

17.1.1.2. I cannot concede that the same holds for the ACA in that its structuring, as stated in President Obama’s response to me “Because of the Affordable Care Act, millions of Americans finally have access to quality, affordable health insurance.” is for a minority vs a majority. U.S. DHHS released numbers on 07-Jan-2016 that a total of 11.3 million enrolled. U.S. Population is 323.8 million. That results in only 3.5% of Americans participating in the plan.

17.1.1.2.1. The religion of Islam’s Sharia Law of Economics states that, “All Muslims who live above the subsistence level must pay an annual alms, known as zakat. This is not charity, but rather an obligation owed by the eligible Muslim to the poor of the community.” I think this holds very applicable to what the ACA is intended to do in providing for health care for those who can’t afford it and penalizing those who can and those who do not want to or do not participate. Furthermore, considering the failure of President Obama to identify the actions of islamic code fighters, supra, the ACA has overtones of the Sharia Law of Economics from a Socialist who has a background related to Islam. This also relates to my arguments about the party of the Democrats being a collation party of the new liberal-socialist-communist democrats.

17.1.2. Second, the principle or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion.

17.1.2.1. I argue here and have argued so previously that the ACA and the Social Security Act protect some religions by providing “The exception for certain grandfathered church plans”, while denying others or forcing them to comply with the tenets of these grandfathered church plans, or make them pay what I will now call islamic zakat tax religious penalties for non-participation.
17.1.2.2. I argue that both the ACA and the SSA fail this second part of the “Lemon Test”.

17.1.3. Third, the statute or policy must not result in an "excessive entanglement" of government with religion.

17.1.3.1. I argue here and have argued so previously that the ACA and the Social Security Act by protecting some religions by providing “The exception for certain grandfathered church plans”, while denying others or forcing them to comply with the tenets of these grandfathered church plans, or make them pay religious penalties for non-participation creates excessive entanglement.

17.1.3.2. I argue that both the ACA and the SSA fail this third part of the “Lemon Test”.

17.1.4. Failure to meet any of these criteria is a proof that the statute or policy in question violates the Establishment Clause.

17.1.4.1. I argue here because the ACA and the SSA fail the second and third parts of the “Lemon Test” that they both violate the Establishment Clause and should be declared unconstitutional. Furthermore, the ACA also violates the first part of the “Lemon Test”. I will say that the ACA and SSA are “LEMONS”, like have a major defect, Constitutional Violations!

17.1.5. (The decision in Lemon v. Kurtzman hinged upon the conclusion that the government benefits were flowing disproportionately to Catholic schools, and that Catholic schools were an integral component of the Catholic Church's religious mission, thus the policy involved the state in an "excessive entanglement" with religion.)

17.1.5.1. I argue here that government benefits, both in payment, and protection through exemption as argued previously, of the ACA and the SSA are flowing disproportionately to select groups because of the Government’s intentional purpose in constructing the plans and the Government’s failure to manage and control the plans over time. Emphasis on the SSA. However, one only needs to consider the delays, changes, and executive orders, and the ongoing court battles associated with the ACA.


18.1. She is writing about, “The United States was on the brink of abandoning the separation of church and state but has pulled back from the precipice. The best evidence of that are two recent legal actions taken against the corrupt Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (“FLDS”):”

18.2. She concludes with, “Without Justice Scalia, however, we may well be able to return to a world in which the separation of church and state is treated as the guardian against corruption and oppression that it is.”
18.2.1. I wonder here, has our separation of powers in our Government, been so corrupted by politics that it is now fashionable to use the death of a Supreme Court Justice as a victory?

18.2.1.1. I hope not! But considering Obama’s audacity, as in a rude or disrespectful behavior; brazenness against US\(^2\) and our First Two Supreme Laws, the Declaration of Independence and our Constitution, in his declaration, “AUDACITY of HOPE ...” hope just may be dead if this Judiciary doesn’t provide all the Relief I seek.

18.2.1.2. Let me be clear, again I must confess great doubt in my hope, as one of the big battles in the presidential primaries has already started with the two main candidates, it is a battle over potentially selecting multiple Supreme Court Justices over the next 4 to 8 years.

18.2.1.2.1. This is exacerbated by the fact that Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg has strongly and negatively spoken out against Mr. Trump, and calling the next president a “she”, referring to Hillary Clinton, the Secretary of State manager who failed to manage according to the 1998 ARB resulting in the murder of 4 American Citizens on her watch, and she fumbled around like a woman putting on make-up while speeding down an Interstate while they were being attacked before they were murdered, and then she lied about the cause of the attack and blamed it on an American Constitutional Liberty, the Freedom of Speech: they all can stand, piss, defecate, and burn our FLAG, but we can’t burn their satanic book?

(8) Early May 2016 Obama calls for balancing Free Speech with Respect for Religion!!! His religion of Islam!

18.2.1.2.1. Then, I’m reminded Justice Ginsberg is of the bloodlines that butchered GOD and the PROCESS of ISRAEL in the time of Ezra, and used the Romans to crucify the FLESH of GOD!!!

19. How has our Republic fallen so far?

19.1. Is there any hope in the people taking it back from the Federal Politicians in all three branches: Legislative-Executive-Judicial?

19.2. I’m hear fighting for our very Declaration of Independence and our Constitutional Liberties, because those Federal Politicians ignored their oath and Ministerial Duties to uphold, protect, and defend these Supreme Legal Documents, and ignored my request for help to petition the Government for a redress of grievances, another Liberty.

19.3. I call upon the Judiciary to protect me from those who were instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed and have violated their oaths and Ministerial Duties.

20. AWE, our Founding Fathers were very concerned about our very present time in the LIFE of our REPUBLIC, for they vehemently stated in their Declaration of Independence, “But when a long train of abuses and usurpations, pursuing invariably the same Object evinces a design to reduce them under absolute Despotism, it is their right, it is their duty, to throw off such Government, and to provide new Guards for their future security”.

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